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Exchange-Rate Interventions 
 
 
Exchange-rate interventions, also referred to as foreign exchange (forex) interventions, 
are operations by the central bank performed in the foreign currency market(s) with the 
aim of affecting (or “managing”) the exchange rate of the national currency. By 
definition, such transactions consist in purchases or sales of assets denominated in 
foreign currency and are undertaken continuously under fixed (or pegged) exchange-
rate regimes to maintain the peg at the announced level. Yet forex interventions may 
also frequently occur under flexible (or floating) exchange-rate arrangements, to smooth 
out potentially abrupt exchange-rate adjustment especially when forex volatility is 
higher than usual. 
 
To understand better the mechanism of forex interventions, it is instructive to look at an 
aggregate (and simplified) version of a standard balance sheet for a (hypothetical) 
central bank (Table 4). As for other corporations, the balance sheet records the assets 
and liabilities (plus capital) of a central bank at a given point in time. The assets include 
the central bank’s portfolio of monetary gold and Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) at the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (item A1 in Table 4), foreign assets (A2) and 
domestic credit (A3). The central bank’s liabilities include the currency in circulation 
outside banks (L1), the reserves held by all other banks on accounts with the central 
bank or as cash in their vaults (L2) and, by convention, the capital of the central bank, 
or its net worth (L3). The monetary gold and the liquid part of foreign assets comprise 
the gross international (or official) reserves the central bank can use for the purpose of 
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forex interventions, sales or purchases. The domestic government bonds can, in turn, be 
used for the purpose of open market operations, sales or purchases. The loans to 
domestic banks are also called (bank) refinancing (operations or policy) in Europe, or 
discount loans (or policy) in the United States. The sum of the currency in circulation 
and the reserves of banks forms the monetary base, also known as the M0 monetary 
aggregate or high-powered (or central-bank) money. 
 
Table 4  Simplified balance sheet of a hypothetical central bank, in billions of national 
currency units at a given point of time 
Assets Liabilities 
A1. Monetary gold and SDRs at IMF 
A2. Foreign assets 
    A2a. Foreign government bonds 
    A2b. Foreign currency deposits 
A3. Domestic credit 
    A3a. Domestic government bonds 
    A3b. Loans to domestic banking system 
5 
25 
15 
10 
70 
25 
45 
L1. Currency in circulation 
    L1a. Notes 
    L1b. Coins 
L2. Bank reserves 
    L2a. Required minimum 
    L2b. Held in excess 
    L2c. Vault cash 
L3. Capital 
80 
75 
5 
10 
5 
2 
3 
10 
Total 100 Total 100 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
 
One can see the difference between non-sterilized and sterilized forex interventions by 
comparing their respective effect on the balance sheet of the central bank (Krugman et 
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al., 2012, pp. 493–533). Abstracting from valuation adjustments (whose effects would 
not be large for a shorter time lapse), and assuming that the net worth of the central 
bank stays constant (which, indeed, is a realistic hypothesis), then any change in the 
assets side between two dates should be matched by a corresponding change in the 
liabilities side. A purchase of any asset by the central bank has to be paid for with 
currency or a check from the central bank, both of which are denominated in domestic 
currency, thus increasing the supply of money in circulation. A sale of any asset by the 
central bank will have to be paid for with currency or a check given to the central bank, 
both of which are denominated in domestic currency. The central bank retains the 
currency into its vault or reduces the amount of bank reserves by the amount of the 
check, hence causing the supply of money in circulation to shrink. 
 
Central banks trade foreign government bonds and foreign currency deposits, which are 
substitutes to a high degree as both are very liquid assets denominated in foreign 
currency, in the foreign exchange markets. Quantities of both foreign currency deposits 
and foreign government bonds that are bought and sold influence the exchange rate. 
Because buying and selling of foreign bonds or foreign currency on deposits in the 
foreign exchange market affects the domestic money supply, a central bank may want to 
offset this effect. This offsetting effect is called sterilization, or a sterilized (forex) 
intervention. For example, if the central bank sells foreign bonds in the foreign 
exchange market (say, –1 billion units of national currency recorded in item A2a), it can 
buy domestic government bonds in bond markets in the same amount (recorded as +1 
billion units of national currency in item A3a) so as to leave the amount of money in 
circulation unchanged. 
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As Sarno and Taylor (2002, pp. 208–44) argue, the rationale for engaging in official 
exchange-rate interventions can be explained by four main arguments: (i) the wrong-
rate argument under float states that an inefficient forex market may tend to generate the 
“wrong” exchange rate, which implies ex-ante abnormal returns, rather than the 
“correct” rate, defined as corresponding to economic fundamentals; (ii) the information-
set-mismatch argument maintains that some information used by market participants 
may be inaccurate or misleading in comparison to the information set of the authorities; 
(iii) the argument of offsetting temporary disturbances applies to cases of exchange rate 
overshooting or cross-country policy interdependence; and (iv) the adjustment-
smoothing argument invokes smoothing the adjustment process of exchange rates from 
short-run values to long-run values. 
 
According to their types, forex interventions are usually distinguished in terms of: (i) 
non-sterilized versus sterilized ones; (ii) public (announced) versus secret ones; and (iii) 
internationally coordinated (concerted) versus non-coordinated ones. 
 
A strong consensus exists that non-sterilized forex intervention acts like monetary 
expansion or contraction, and that it is rather effective in inducing changes in the 
monetary base, hence in the broader monetary aggregates and interest rates, and 
ultimately in market expectations and the exchange rate. The effectiveness of sterilized 
interventions is, by contrast, controversial and the empirical evidence is mixed. Their 
effect may arise if private agents change their exchange-rate expectations because they 
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change their view either of the likely future actions of the central bank or of the impact 
of certain actions of the central bank. 
 
Research on forex interventions has been focused on developed economies and has been 
impaired by data secrecy – at the relevant intraday frequencies, in particular – and by 
the resulting indirect approaches to uncover their key effects, themselves differing for 
various exchange rate pairs and horizons. Correcting for such deficiencies in the data 
coverage and availability and in the related econometric methodologies has recently 
revealed the influences of intervention timings and information spillovers (see 
Domingues, 2003, for G3 currency pairs) or the differences typical for emerging market 
economies (Menkhoff, 2013) and has produced more than twice stronger (see Chen et 
al., 2012, for the US dollar–yen rate) or asymmetric (see Fatum et al., 2013, for the 
Danish krone–euro rate) effects of interventions. Further criticisms to this literature 
have argued that the central bank may intervene to exert an impact on the exchange rate 
but with a number of drawbacks, such as inflating a real-estate bubble and/or increasing 
financial instability. Moreover, as was the case of the Bank of England in the pre-crisis 
period of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (early 1990s), forex interventions 
may do little to fix the underlying problems related to the business cycle, the economic 
structure, policy coordination, and/or market expectations. 
 
ALEXANDER MIHAILOV 
 
See also: 
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Cash; Central bank money; Financial instability; High-powered money; Housing 
bubble; International Monetary Fund; International reserves; Monetary aggregates; 
Open-market operations; Sterilization. 
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